By Lynn Holt
This ebook introduces and explores the position of apprehension in reasoning - commencing the issues, making a choice on the vocabulary, solving the limits, and wondering what's usually taken with no consideration. Lynn Holt argues powerful perception of rationality needs to comprise highbrow virtues which can't be diminished to a collection of ideas for reasoners, and argues that the advantage of apprehension, an got disposition to determine issues adequately, is needed if rationality is to be defensible. Drawing on an Aristotelian notion of highbrow advantage and examples from the sciences, Holt exhibits why impersonal criteria for rationality are inaccurate, why foundations for wisdom are the final components to emerge from inquiry now not the 1st, and why instinct is a bad alternative for advantage. by means of putting the present scene in old viewpoint, Holt screens the present deadlock because the inevitable final result of the alternative of highbrow advantage with strategy within the early sleek philosophical mind's eye. Written in an interesting and jargon-free type, this e-book is of curiosity to a variety of readers, quite epistemologists and philosophers of technology eager about the destiny of cause.
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Additional info for Apprehension: Reason in the Absence of Rules (Ashgate Epistemology & Mind) (Ashgate Epistemology & Mind)
At most, it seems, their contextualism provides an account of some kind of rational acceptability that does not entail a high probability of truth. But, of course, this is not to say that problemsolving approaches to scientific rationality are worthless; nor is this to assume that some empirical beliefs are in fact epistemically justified in the relevant sense. Rather, the' main point here is that the contex- 40 CHAPTER II tualism of Kuhn, Brown, and Laudan appears not to be directly relevant to the question of whether, and if so how, some empirical beliefs are epistemically justified.
Reidel, Dordrecht, 1970), pp. 85-86. 11 Such examples have been set forth, for instance, by Richard Feldman, 'An Alleged Defect in Gettier Counter-Examples', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52 (1974), 68-69, and Keith Lehrer, 'The Gettier Problem and the Analysis of Knowledge', in G. S. ), Justification and Knowledge, (D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1979), p. 75. For a useful discussion of such examples, see Robert Shope, The Analysis of Knowing (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1983), Chapter 1.
A social consensus about the rational acceptability or the truth of a particular belief enables one to hold simply that many people agree that this belief is rationally acceptable or true. But clearly such agreement is insufficient by itself to give one a good reason to believe that this belief is rationally acceptable or true. Note that if a social consensus were sufficient for justification, then every belief, including contradictions, could be justified, since we can have a social consensus about every belief.
Apprehension: Reason in the Absence of Rules (Ashgate Epistemology & Mind) (Ashgate Epistemology & Mind) by Lynn Holt